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BOOK REVIEWS
Frankl'yn S Haiman. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1981. Pp. 480. $22.50 (cloth).
SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY.

SPEECH CATEGORIES AND THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW

Ideas are the currency with which scholars trade. It is therefore no
surprise that the law governing the free expression of ideas has been a
source of elaborate attention from legal scholars. In this particular corner of the law, the dialectical process between justices and commentators has been an intriguing and important one.' Despite this ongoing
and fruitful exchange, however, the general approaches to first amendment adjudication developed during the past half century have either
been confined, 2 moved from adjudicative guide to slogan,3 or have lack4
ed the theoretical sweep and power sufficient to control the field.
In particular, Professor Thomas Emerson's work, 5 which relied
heavily upon the speech-action distinction as an analytic starting point,
and which claimed Justices Black and Douglas as significant adherents,
lost some of its influence in the confrontational speech problems of the
late sixties and early seventies.6 The most important successor to Emerson's approach appeared for a time to be the "two tracks" of "categorization" and "balancing" that Professor Ely7 developed and that
Professor Tribe8 further elaborated. But that model has fallen on hard
times. 9 Supplementing these general approaches are a barrage of first
I See, e.g., L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960), cited in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
2 The "clear and present danger" test for speech restrictions was a long-touted general
approach, but the test now seems confined to problems of incitement to illegal action, see, e.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), threats to the fair administration of justice,
see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), and perhaps to attempts to
restrain the press prior to publication, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 726-27, 730 (1971) (Brennan & Stewart, J.J., concurring).
3 One hears little contemporary talk of "preferred position." See McKay, The Preference
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959). Although preferred-position analysis originated
as an adjudicative guide, it now serves only as a slogan.
4 I argue in Part II, infla, that Professor Ely's "categorization" and "balancing" appraoch is so lacking. See generaly Ely, FlagDesecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1974); see also Scanlon,
Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519 (1979); Schauer,
CATEGORIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A PLAY IN THREE ACTS, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265
(1981).
5 See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
6 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
7 Ely, supra note 4.
8 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 580-84 (1978).
9

See in/a text accompanying notes 55-68.
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amendment constructs,1 0 value orientations," and suggested adjudicative methodologies.1 2 Some rise and fall in scholarly importance, some
for a time capture a few adherents on the bench, and many are valuable
contributions to an evolving and important literature.
Into this already-crowded scholars' horn of plenty, Professor Franklyn S. Haiman has squeezed a lengthy work entitled Speech and Law in a
Free Society. 13 The book attempts to chart a decidedly libertarian course
through a variety of free speech problems, such as defamation, incitement, speech and national security. Professor Haiman borrows from
several established categories of speech, and attempts to generate a few
of his own. He offers a view of each of his chosen first amendment concerns, exposes some of the leading ideas in the literature in the field, and
proposes his own recommended "solution" for each problem. As a briefcarrier for a libertarian perspective, Haiman is consistent in his advocated preferences. As an advance in thinking about "speech and law,"
however, Haiman's contribution is less evident. Part I of this review
traces some defects which I perceive in the book's structure, analytical
approach, and method of argument. Part II, drawing on several themes
developed in Part I, argues that the current judicial approach to "categorization" is ultimately unstable and therefore unsatisfying as a general
mode of first amendment adjudication.
I
In his introductory chapter, Professor Haiman discloses his civillibertarian preference and sets forth, without attempt at defense or justi4
fication, "those ultimate values. . . on which [the] book is premised."'
He then enumerates several judgments, all of which are intellectually
controversial to some degree: social order is not an "end in itself," but
"self-expression and self-fulfillment of the individuals who compose a
society are [such] ends

.

..

";15

the purpose of law is solely "to prevent

people from aggrandizing against one another";' 6 humans are capable
of free choice and autonomous decision;1 7 regimes of paternalism are
suspect;18 and a free marketplace of ideas is a mechanism on which we
10

See, e.g., Note, The Chilling Efect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
See, -e.g., Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964
(1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theog, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
521; Karst, Equalit as a CentralPinciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
12 See, e.g., Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analsis, 34 STAN. L. REv.
11

113 (1981).
13
F. HAIMAN,
14

Id at6.

15

Id

16
17

Id

Is

See id at 7.
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See id at 6-7.

(1981).
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can properly rely in our pursuit of truth.1 9 Haiman states that these
values generate a forceful preference for a regime of free expression and
a concomitant burden of justification upon any claim that seeks to
subordinate communicative values to other values. Most of the remaining chapters strive to apply this preference to a variety of discrete
problems in the law of free speech.
What precedes that effort, however, is an attempt to define
"speech" for constitutional purposes. Professor Haiman is a professor of
communication studies, rather than of law. In the book's second chapter, running for twenty-five pages and entitled "What is Speech?" 20 one
might expect his orientation and knowledge base to yield a unique contribution. Haiman emphasizes what it means "to communicate," focusing on the interactive aspects of communicative activities (i.e., speakers
and listeners). The universe of activity to be classified, Professor Haiman
tells us, is either "symbolic" behavior, which functions to communicate
"ideas and feelings to other people,1 2 1 or nonsymbolic behavior. The
use of words is always symbolic conduct, and hence can never be defined
as "not speech." Nonlinguisitc behavior at times functions symbolically,
however, and at such times should be viewed as "speech." Although
terming behavior "speech" does not necessarily immunize it from legal
regulation, Haiman believes that such a labeling of behavior instantly
constitutionalizes the inquiry.
For analytic purposes, Haiman divides nonlinguistic behavior into
three categories: (1) conduct that is exclusively symbolic and that
"functions only to create meanings"; 22 (2) conduct engaged in "for its
own sake," totally without regard for "any possible effect upon an audience or witness"; 23 and (3) conduct that ordinarily falls in category two,
but that "may be endowed by the actor, perceiver, or observer with
meaning. . . beyond the act itself," and hence made to create meanings
"by the way in which it functions. '24 Haiman concludes that conduct
in the first and third categories should be treated as "speech," while
conduct in the second category should not.
None of this seems terribly helpful in resolving the problems raised
in so-called symbolic speech cases, 25 or in the kinds of cases for which
Professor Emerson elaborated his speech-action distinction. First, it is
not evident that even linguistic behavior is entirey symbolic; 26 talking

23

S" id
Id at 16-40.
Id at 31.
Id
Id at 32.

24

Id

19
20
21
22

at 33.

25 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (flag burning); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft-card burning).
26 See Ely, supra note 4, at 1493-96.
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involves the pure creation of noise from the vocal chords, writing the
consumption of writing materials and surfaces, radio broadcasts the use
of electricity and various materials, and so on. Of course the same could
be said of Haiman's first category of nonlinguistic behavior-for example, wearing a black arm band requires placing a piece of black material
over flesh or other fabric. Thus, Haiman's first category"-"exclusively
symbolic" behavior-is an empty one. Every remaining case must be
either in the second category (conduct engaged in "for its own sake") or
the third (conduct that "functions as communication"), but every category-two case becomes a prima facie category-three case simply by the
actor claiming that the challenged conduct functioned as communication. Professor Haiman would permit a court to test the bonafes
of a
claim that nonlinguistic behavior so functioned, whether or not intended by the actor, but such a test would likely exclude only that behavior lacking an audience capable of cognition. Every plausible speech
claim, whether linguistic or nonlinguistic in its expressive method, thus
collapses into Professor Haiman's third category.
This collapsibility of Professor Haiman's categories debilitates his
general framework for resolving the legal problems generated by speech
cases of this variety. He recommends a seemingly ad hoc balancing process, in which harms generated to legitimate governmental interests by
the nonsymbolic elements of the conduct would be weighed against the
speech values advanced by the symbolic element of the challenged conduct. 27 This construct seems roughly equivalent to the "balancing"
track of the two-track model. A major premise of the two-track method,
however, is that cases can only be properly "tracked" for analytic purposes upon identification of governmental motivation for proscribing
the challenged conduct. 28 Because Haiman's framework in effect considers all observed conduct as speech, the critical question becomes
whether the government is interested in the symbolic or nonsymbolic
qualities of the conduct. Yet Professor Haiman never focuses on how
the nature of the government's interest is to be ascertained. Nor does he
suggest or discuss the possible review standards that might follow such
ascertainment. And without those critical steps, his general approach
might well be less protective of symbolic speech than current law.
This analytic omission seems symptomatic of a larger failing of the
book. In general, it fails to consider the world of adjudication and the
conventions of adjudication tailored to free speech cases. 29 Haiman usually treats the problems as abstact exercises in the accommodation of
See F. HAIMAN, supra note 13, at 35-37.
28 See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2, at 584-88.
29 No mention is made, for instance, of the overbreadth doctrine as a tool of first amendment problem-solving. See generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 1; Note, The
First Amendment Ouerbreadth Doctrine 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
27
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competing substantive values, rather than as issues usually presented for
authoritative resolution in the adjudicative process. It may well be that
Haiman's primary audience, both in his mind and in fact, is composed
of students of journalism and communications rather than law, and that
this accounts for the de-emphasis on a lawyering perspective. The likelihood that Professor Haiman contemplated this sort of audience helps
defend him against the charge, otherwise quite serious, that his book
never addresses the critical and enduring first amendment problem of
the "public forum."' 30 Moreover, perspectives other than the lawyer'sfor instance, those ofjournalists, philosophers, 3 1 or economists,3 2 -surely
are useful in the attempt to broaden insights into problems of speech
regulation. Except for his general libertarian outlook, however, Haiman
never quite manages to adopt any particular professional perspective on
the issues that he discusses.
Haiman's unresolved focus interferes with the work in a variety of
ways. First, the organization of the material into several discrete main
parts--Communication About Other People (e.g., defamation, privacy),
Communication to Other People (e.g., misrepresentations and obscene
or violent speech), Communication and Social Order (e.g., incitement,
conspiracy), and Government Involvement in the Communication Marketplace (e.g., government secrecy)-is never explained or justified. The
titles of the various parts may be the major problem, for every chapter
could be placed in a section called "Communication to Other People."
The order of the material is likewise unexplained. Part one, for instance, primarily addresses speech that may injure some third party because of the listener's response, while Part two primarily concerns speech
that may injure listeners themselves. Yet Professor Haiman does not
advance these as organizing motifs and, indeed, the placement of various subject matters would have been problematic if he had done so.
Does the vice of obscenity, for instance, lie in its capacity to debase its
consumers, 33 in its tendency to stimulate acts of sexual violence, 34 or in
its general assault on the ambience of public places in the community?
Haiman's organizational structure limits his analytic vision, reducing
the likelihood that alternative explanations will receive his full
attention.
The content of the particularized, problem-focused chapters reflects
30 See, e.g., Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilitie, 64 VA. L. REV. 1287
(1977); sources cited id at 1288 n.9.
31 See, e.g., Scanlon, A Theogv of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
32 See, e.g., Coase, The Marketfor Goods and the Marketfor deas, 64 J. AM. ECON. ASS'N 384
(1974).
33 This is the only direct focus of Haiman's look at obscenity problems. See F. HAIMAN,
supra note 13, at 164-65.
34
Professor Haiman briefly addresses this perspective on the problem in chapter 12,
"Incitement to Illegal Action." See id
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Haiman's expansive faith in an open system of free expression. Each
chapter outlines the contours of a particular legal problem involving
speech considerations, trots through several leading cases considering
the problem, explores in some detail the variety of academic commentary on the questions, and ultimately advances a particular view as the
optimum solution-usually Haiman's own, but occasionally one
originated by the American Civil Liberties Union,35 or some particular,
identified commentator.3 6 Haiman proposes strict limitations on defamation suits, preferring retraction and opportunities to reply over litigation against the press. 3 7 On the ground that newsworthiness or decency
standards are incompatible with a regime of free expression, he would
limit privacy tort suits against publishers to instances of misappropriation of information. 38 He sees no justification under the first amendment for treating truthful commercial speech differently from other
forms of speech.3 9 He argues that police should always make substantial
efforts to protect speakers against unruly or hostile crowds, rather than
remove such speakers by arrest or otherwise from potentially violent situations. 4° True to his belief that individuals are autonomous agents responsible for their behavior and judgments, he would also confine the
law of incitement-to-illegal-action to those situations in which speakers
have taken "control over the will of other persons," 41 resulting in the
listeners losing "the capacity to resist the communicator's
' '42
inducements.
I agree intuitively with a great many of Professor Haiman's conclusions, although not all of them. 43 Intellectually, however, I remain troubled by his argument in several respects. First, the book is profoundly
ahistorical. One could read it and never know, for example, of the existence of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the evolution of obscenity standards
over this century, the political and historical setting of the World War I
35 See, e.g., id at 380 (ACLU Policy No. 7, recommending a qualified "advice privilege"
for Presidential Advisers, "is as careful a statement of [the appropriate] balance as we are
likely to find").
36 See, e.g., id. at 196-99 (partial agreement with Professor Martin Redish on topic of
commercial speech); id. at 259 (approval of Aichigan Law Review Note on "standards for police conduct in hostile audience situations').
37 See id at 43-60.
38 See, e.g., id at 61-86. He rejects as inconsistent with a regime of free expression, tort
liability for publication of truthful but embarrassing facts. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
39 See id at 182-202.
40 See id. at 252-60.
41 Id at 277.
42
Id
43
I would not, for instance, go so far as Haiman on the incitement standard quoted at
the end of the preceding paragraph in text. Utter loss of will in the listeners would be difficult
to substantiate, and I cannot see what is lost in prohibiting, or gained in protecting, speech
intended to bring about imminent and serious lawlessness, and likely to do so.
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free speech cases beginning with Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten," or the
influence of the civil rights movement of the fifties and sixties on the
development of free speech law. 45 Whether or not one is committed to
historical limitations on free expression, judicial pronouncements concerning the scope of the first amendment cannot be fairly evaluated
46
without some sense of what has gone before.
Second, and more generally, the author's method of argument contributes both the book's most significant strength and its most telling
weakness. Without any pretense of value-neutrality, in conflict after
conflict between free expression and competing concerns, Professor
Haiman resolves issues by openly stating his preference for the speech
values. 47 His preferences and mine frequently coincide, but ours do not
always coincide with those of others. In the history of the law of free
expression, it is the hard cases, the path-breaking cases, the paradigm
cases that have involved difficult and controversial choices among competing values and differing conceptions of the individual's role in the
community. On the basis of what sort of argument can one persuade or
protect the regime of free expression against the judge whose values slide
toward the other side of the scale?
II
Repeated incantations about "robust debate" or "preferred position" cannot solve the problem of choice among competing interests.
Scholars have argued from time to time, however, that attention to
methodology and adjudicative approach may help structure the inquiry
to enhance consistent judicial treatment of speech values.
A relatively recent and significant example of this sort of scholarly
strategy is the "categorization" and balancing model elaborated by Professor Ely in his Flag Desecration article. 48 Built upon a structure of inquiry initially formulated in United States v. O'Brien,49 the model calls for
different judicial treatment of "content-focused," as distinguished from
"content-neutral," regulations that inhibit expression.5 0 Professor Ely
proposes that the constitutional validity of content-neutral regulations-those whose purpose is independent of the message being con244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), reo'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
46 See Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1980) (general
discussion of the pre-1917 history of the first amendment).
47 See F. HAIMAN, supra note 13, at 127, 134, 147, 155-56, 181.
48 Ely, supra note 4.
49 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
50 For a general discussion and criticism of the content distinction, see Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. LJ. 727 (1980); Redish, The
Content Distinztion in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981); Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because ofits Content.: The PeculiarCaseofSubject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81
(1978).
44
45
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veyed-be judged by a balancing test, in which the state's interest,
including the costs of pursuing alternative methods of achieving that
interest, is weighed against the speech values implicated by the regulation. Speech regulations focusing on the content of the message would
be subject to the "categorization" approach in which several "rigorously
defined" categories of speech would be excluded from protection, and
all other forms of speech would be protected by an absolute, or nearabsolute standard.
When originally formulated, this approach had substantial appeal.
It helped to eradicate some long-standing confusion that the so-called
expression-action distinction had generated, 51 and it resolved the flagdesecration problem, 5 2 the situation to which Professor Ely applied it.
Some first amendment problems had been left off these tracks-most
notably problems of the reporter's privilege 53 and press access to government facilities 54-- but no other scholar presented an overarching theory
that neatly solved those problems. Soon, however, it became apparent
that the Court's first amendment decisions could not be squared with
the model's presuppositions. Several lines of cases reveal this. The obscenity decisions from 1965 to 1973, 55 together with a general loosening
of inhibitions on public discussion and consumption of sexually oriented
material, helped to generate a substantial, notorious, and to some quite
revolting open market in sexually explicit entertainment . The Court
tightened the definition of obscenity in 1973,56 and in various ways reduced constraints on the government's ability to prosecute traffickers in
obscenity. 57 Yet the criminal law probably seemed an inartful, substantively insufficient, and procedurally cumbersome tool with which to
stage the entire fight. In Young v. American Mini-Theatres,58 in which the
Court upheld Detroit's "smut zoning" ordinance, and in FCC v. Pacdfica
Foundation,59 in which the Court upheld the FCC's power to apply the
statutory provision barring "indecency" in broadcasting to a radio
transmission of George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words" comic monologue,
the Court stripped sexually oriented yet nonobscence speech of a meas51 See Ely, supra note 4, at 1493-96 (burning a draft card to express opposition to the
Vietnam War is 100% speech and 100% action).
52
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969).
53 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
54
See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
55 See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
56
57
See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (federal statute prohibiting mailing of
obscene materials incorporates local community standards for prurient appeal and offensiveness, rather than standards determined by state law); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974).
58
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
59
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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ure of its constitutional protection. The notion of "graded" speechspeech offered less protection than other varieties because of its undesirable character and its proximity to the edge of an unprotected category-gained a strong foothold in these two decisions.
Second, in Virginia Pharmay Board v. Virginia Consumer Council 60 the
Court raised commercial speech from its previously unprotected status.
The Court's uneasiness about the move, however, led it to assign a lower
status to commercial speech than to political speech, 61 a development
that lent force to the "graded" speech idea.
Third, the Court in Buckly v. Valeo 62 expressly acknowledged the
first amendment interest in making political contributions and expenditures. Because the financial support standing behind political speech
carries with it the risk of evils that are independent of the purchased
message, however, the Court properly analyzed each campaign finance
restriction and upheld those that met strict first amendment standards.
Thus, Buckley permits suppression of a variant of categorically protected
speech.
Finally, even before Professor Ely wrote, the Court had begun to
draw unprincipled lines for first amendment purposes between print
media and electronic-broadcast media. The tension between the Red
Lion and Tornillo cases63 is a glaring example, as is Pacifica's upholding a
sanction for broadcasting material that, on a printed page, would be
64
immune from governmental proscription of distribution.
Taken together, these developments have undermined the structure
and coherency of the categorical approach. Ely's model had already
invited a degree of judicial discretion but some discretion is inevitable in
any sensible model of adjudication, first amendment or otherwise. The
idea of "graded" speech takes categorizing two dangerous steps further.
First, it adds layers of discretion in grading categories of'protected speech
in order to evaluate suppression justifications. Weighing the speech
value of political comment as compared to commercial messages or
erotic literature, for instance, reintroduces balancing of interests at a
level that increases the likelihood of judicial subjectivity. 65 Second, it
permits grading categories of unprotected speech for purposes of measur60

425 U.S. 748 (1976).

61 See id at 771-72.
62 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
63 Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 394 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of FCC rules requiring broadcasters to permit opportunity to reply to personal attack and political editorials) with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (invalidating state law that required newspapers to afford opportunity to reply to attacks on political candidates).
64 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., Inc., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
65 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) ("few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual
Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice") (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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ing judicial tolerance for expansion of the boundaries of these categories.
This threatens the notion of rigorous definition, one of the proposed
strengths of categorization, and thus carries risks that substantive protection and predictability will diminish.
The outcome of Buckley v. Valeo, 66 in which the Court upheld suppression of a form of "core" protected speech, threatened the categorical
approach in a different manner. Professor Ely had recognized the possibility that speech outside the unprotected categories might constitutionally be proscribed, but he had suggested that a focus on audience
reaction to the speech had historically been, and would likely continue
to be, speech-threatening. 6 7 Buckley upheld campaign contribution limits on the basis of an "audience response"--popular perception of the
undue influence of money on political campaigns. The approach elaborated in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commissi'on 68 may have
strengthened the barrier against suppression of speech not in a defined,
unprotected category, but the risks of manipulation and the vulnerability to political paranoia both seem high within this mode of
69
adjudication.
Finally, the cases that turn on the distinction between broadcast
and print media cannot possibly be squared with categorization as proposed and defended. The type of medium does not alter the composition or justification for the categories: television broadcasts can defame,
or incite to riot, or comment on presidential campaigns, and can do so
as well as books, pamphlets, or films. The rigor of categorization collapses if boundary lines change as media evolve. Moreover, the electronic media's most significant characteristic is its effectiveness in
reaching vast audiences. A system of free expression that handicaps the
more effective means of communication violates our society's belief in
the marketplace of ideas, making vulnerability to speech regulation turn
on the likelihood of reaching and persuading the audience. Such a system reveals an utter lack of faith-a faith that the advocates of categorization demonstrate-in the commitment to enlightenment and
rationality on which the entire system of speech protection is presumably based.
Several explanations may be offered for the splintering of the twotrack approach. First, as suggested above, the approach was not comprehensive enough to handle all free speech problems. 70 In particular,
its libertarian underpinnings aimed it at the traditional constitutional
66 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
67 Ely, supra note 4, at 1493 n.44, 1500-02.
68 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (permitting content-based suppression of speech not in an unprotected category only if the prohibition is a "narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling
state interest").
69 See infia note 86 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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concern of the scope of "negative rights," rights to be "left alone" by the
government. The approach thus predictably failed to generate a principled structure for the resolution of affirmative claims. 7 1 Moreover, the
judicial response to affirmative claims may have affected more traditional claims. The rejection of press access to certain government-operated institutions, for example, might well have generated some of the
momentum that led to Herbert v. Lando, 72 in which the Court sanctioned
intrusive discovery practices in defamation cases.
Second, and far more fundamentally, the categorization approach
could not survive for long in its present form, nor endure in any particular form, because of the way in which law develops. "Categories" are
always, and should always be, vulnerable to the process of reordering,
rerationaliztion, and value realignment. 73 Current first amendment categories are perfect candidates for this sort of evolution, and the developments in obscenity law suggest that the first steps in the process have
74
begun.
The potential for more wholesale reordering can be seen in the existing structure and analytical focus of the categories of defamation, obscenity, fighting words, and incitement. Constitutionally rooted
defamation principles focus primarily on the speaker's state of mind and
are designed to generate "breathing space" for press judgment on newsworthy matters. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 75 false and reputation-injuring speech, if uttered without either knowledge of its falsehood
or reckless disregard of the truth, will not produce a recovery, even
though the reputational harm to the defamed may be quite serious and
indistinguishable from that caused by an intentional falsehood. The
principles of accommodation between state defamation law and the first
amendment thus permit concrete harm to individuals to go unremedied
in order to enhance a dynamic and relatively fearless press.
By contrast, obscenity standards define a category of speech by its
degree of explicitness, offensiveness, and lack of "value," independent of
its power to arouse. 76 That any social or individual harm occurs from
such speech is a matter of substantial controversy, 77 yet the existing doc71
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 54. But cf.Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102
S. Ct. 2613 (1982) (invalidating state law barring access to portion of criminal trial); Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (overturning state court order to same
effect).
72
441 U.S. 153 (1979); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (refusing
to carve out press exception to fourth amendment).
73
Cf McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (rerationalizing earlier cases holding manufacturers liable to injured parties not in privity with
manufacturers).
74 See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
75
376 U.S. 255 (1964).
76 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
77
See THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT (1970).
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trine tolerates a legislative presumption that such harm may occur.
Thus, while admittedly harmful defamation may be protected speech,
arguably harmless pornography is not.
By further contrast, the incitement and fighting-words categories
are marked by the quality that illuminates Holmes's famous "Fire!" example:78 all involve situations in which speech is highly likely to produce immediate and dangerous physical response, without time for
reflection or opportunity for counter-speech. In other words, these latter
two categories, unlike defamation or obscenity, are premised on a "marketplace-of-ideas" model of free expression, representing cases in which
the speech seems designed to bring about action, market failure is highly
likely and thus renders actual harm predictably imminent, and the costs
of market failure are serious.
This variable treatment of harms across various categories of unprotected speech renders the present structure of categorical analysis insufficient. As new problems arise, the dissonance across the categories
will impede the making of decisions that are consistent with the existing
structure. For example, consider a hypothetical statute prohibiting the
dissemination of material portraying or describing graphic and explicit
violence to humans.7 9 Should the constitutionality of such a statute, assuming that it meets standards of fair warning and specificity, be judged
by analogy to obscenity on the ground that both sexually obscene and
graphically violent portrayals are debasing and dehumanizing, and that
both may lead in some undemonstrable way to acts of unlawful violence? If obscenity is the appropriate analogical category, the statute
may well be constitutional because the government will not bear the risk
of empirical uncertainty concerning the speech-harm nexus. If, on the
other hand, such a statute must be evaluated by analogy to incitement,
including its requirements of imminence of harm and intent to cause
such harm,8 0 the statute presumably fails on its face for drastic
overbreadth.
The categorization approach generates these questions, but cannot
answer them. Broader concerns about speech and social patterns must
be addressed in order to solve the problem of the "no violence" statute.
Analogously, as concern over sexual permissiveness increases and tolerance for sexually explicit material decreases, the boundary between the
obscene and nonobscene begins to blur."' The deep and irreconcilable
division within the Court in the past term's "book removal" case8 2 is
78

See generaly Schenck v. United States, 294 U.S. 47 (1919).

79

See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence. FirstAmendment Ptincplesand Social

Science Theog, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123 (1978).
80 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 295 U.S. 444 (1969).
81 See sutpra text accompanying notes 55-59.
82 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
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powerful evidence of the influence of different judicial conceptions of
individual freedom and community authority on first amendment litigation. Similarly, the "breathing space" for the press generated by New
York Tines Co. v. Sullivan8 3 and its progeny has been pared,8 4 indicating
perhaps that the "checking value"8' 5 has lost some ground in its struggle
with private, reputational values. The most telling objection to a categorical scheme of speech definition and protection, therefore, is that it is
no more stable than the value alignment that lies beneath the categories.
To be fair to Professor Ely, his basic argument was not a defense of
existing, judge-made categories, but rather a favoring of categorization
as a general approach. His justification of this approach was the likelihood that categorization was more likely than ad hoc "balancing" to
86
protect expressive freedom in times of political crisis and paranoia.
The durability of the regime of free expression in such times is a concern
with which I am wholly sympathetic, and it may well be that, as between the two methods Professor Ely describes, categorization is the
more speech protective when government seeks to regulate message content. That leaves us with the question of whether categorization, in its
present general form, is the best that we can do.
Absent reformulation of some of the current categories, the answer
must be no. In particular, a consistent and fully principled theory of
free expression should have a unified view of the requirements of imminence, gravity, and causation of harm by the sanctioned speech.8 7 At
the least, some minimum requirements in this regard must be judicially
set and maintained. Moreover, the electronic media should be fully integrated with other media for first amendment purposes. Whether the
"press" is an interest group, an economic force, a trustee of the freeexpression system,"8 or a beneficiary of the same, no principled justifications exist for a different set of rules for electronic as opposed to print
journalism.
I suggested at the conclusion of Part I of this review that the greatest weakness in Professor Haiman's work might also be its most
profound strength. Whether the free speech law of the future is or is not
categorically focused, Professor Haiman's book contains an element crit83 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
84 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (permitting discovery inquiry into
reportorial and editorial state of mind in defamation cases); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
85 Blasi, supira note 11.
86 Ely, supra note 4, at 1493 n.55, 1501-02.
87 Professor William Van Alstyne has recently argued that virtually all free speech
problems could be analyzed and resolved in these terms. See Van Alstyne,.A Graphic View of
the Free Speech Claue, 70 CALIF. L. Rsv. 107, 125-26 (1982).

Whether the system of free

expression could survive Learned Hand's "gravity of the evil" discount is a different question.
Se id at 131-32.
88 See Lahav, Trstees of Sfrlneresl, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 5617 (1981).
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ical to the survival of a healthy system of free expression. Speech andLaw
in a Free Society recognizes consistently that a speech-protective system is
not cost-free, that its flourishing depends on other values being treated
as secondary when matched against speech values, and that accepting
these costs and so relegating nonspeech values will frequently be socially
and politically controversial. History, stare decisis, and elaborate methodologies of decision are critically important tools of the judicial craft,
but they are no substitute for commitment.
Ira C. Lupu*

*

Professor of Law, Boston University.

A.B. 1968, Cornell University; J.D. 1971,

Harvard University. My thanks to Peter Arenella, Ronald Cass, Pnina Lahav, and Henry
Monaghan for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.

John Finnis. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1980. Pp. xv, 425. $39.00 (cloth), $19.50 (paper).
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS.

The contemporary lawyer or philosopher of law is likely to think of
natural law theory as a rather mysterious strain of legal theory maintaining that unjust law is not really law at all. From this view, natural
law theory is principally concerned with the denial of legal positivism
which, perhaps with equal mystery, denies any necessary connection between law and morality. When understood simply as the denial of legal
positivism, the theory of natural law has found little favor in recent
years; indeed, Lon Fuller, who often championed the theory, once
claimed that the very term "natural law" "has about it a rich, deep odor
of the witches' caldron, and the mere mention of it suffices to unloose a
torrent of emotions and fears."'

One of John Finnis's principal aims in his NaturalLaw and Natural
Rights is to combat this caricature by offering a "re-presentation and
development of the main elements of the 'classical' or 'main stream' the-

ories of natural law."' 2 Such theories attempt to do much more than
support a single claim within the theory of law; a complete theory of
natural law seeks to discover the basic forms of human good, to show
that these support the validity of a few basic practical principles (the
"requirements of practical reasonableness"), and then to apply these
principles to the problems of ethics, political philosophy, and jurisprudence. According to Finnis (and here he follows the classical proponents
of natural law theory), there are objective values that human beings
must promote in their own lives if those lives are to be worthwhile, and

an understanding of these values allows us to formulate principles of
action that help us to pursue the good. Furthermore, to promote objective values in their own lives, people will need to live in communities.
By beginning with a concern for what constitutes a good life for the
individual, therefore, we generate a need for principles of other-regarding morality, including principles of political morality. Only at this
point does natural law theory claim anything about law: it attempts to
show how law is required for the pursuit of the good. This is the outline
that Finnis attempts to develop and flesh out.
To summarize the direction that this development takes, it is easiest
to resort to lists. According to Finnis, there are exactly seven, equally
fundamental, basic values (or basic forms of human good): knowledge,
life, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion. Finnis maintains that it is self-evident that these
1

Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 379 (1946).

2

J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS v

(1980).
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are all equally and intrinsically valuable, and that the pursuit of these
values exhausts the ultimate reasons one could have for action.
Finnis also enumerates nine requirements of practical reasonableness: to form a rational plan of life, to recognize the importance of each
of the seven basic values, to show impartiality among persons, to maintain some detachment from one's specific projects, not to abandon one's
commitments lightly, to pursue the good efficiently, not to choose directly against any basic value, to seek the good of one's communities,
and to refrain from acting as one believes one ought not to act. In order
to pursue one's own good successfully, one must satisfy these requirements. Finnis also explains how the attempt to satisfy them leads one to
pursue the good of others. For example, the pursuit of the basic value of
friendship naturally leads to the related requirement that one seek the
good of one's communities. Hence, the requirements of practical reasonableness, which are themselves prior to morality, lead to moral re3
quirements. As Finnis puts it, each is a "mode" of moral obligation.
Most important among the moral requirements is that individual moral
rights be recognized and respected.
From moral theory, Finnis moves to a discussion of political theory,
with chapters on justice, rights, and authority. Finally, Finnis presents
the natural lawyer's conception of law and legal obligation and ends
with a chapter meant to sketch the reasons for including theology in a
natural law theory. As this attempt to summarize the topics discussed
by Finnis suggests, even for a book of this length, it attempts to cover an
enormous amount of territory. His aim is to provide a natural law theory of practical reasoning, ethics, political philosophy, and
jurisprudence.
In the remainder of this review, I want to examine only the first
stages of Finnis's theory-his account of the basic forms of good and of
the fundamental requirements of practical reasonableness. There is
much of interest in the later parts of his theory, 4 for example, his discussion of authority and obligation, but the most important claim made by
Finnis (and by natural law theorists generally) is that an understanding
of morality, justice, law, authority, and obligation must rest ultimately
on a proper understanding of human good or well-being. A theory of
value is supposed to provide the necessary support for moral, political,
and legal theory. Although I find much with which I can agree in Finnis's discussion of moral, political, and legal theory, I do not believe that
he succeeds in his attempt to base his substantive conclusions in these
areas on his theory of value.
3 Id at 126.
4 I discuss the later stages of the theory in a short review of Finnis's book that is forthcoming in The PhilosophicalReview. There, I focus on Finnis's claim that description and
evaluation of law should not be treated as independent activities.
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I
THE GOOD

As we have seen, Finnis claims that there are seven basic forms of
objective intrinsic value. However, why should we believe that anything is objectively valuable? Furthermore, even if we are willing to accept that there are (or may be) objective values, why should we accept
Finnis's list? Finnis's disconcerting answer is that the intrinsic value of
the items on his list is self-evident. If his defense ended here, it would
apparently be possible to reply merely by saying that Finnis's "goods"
do not seem so good. Fortunately, Finnis says a good bit more. He is in
an uncomfortable position, however, because if he were to end his de'fense with the bald claim of self-evidence, he would have nothing to say
to anyone tempted to disagree-and many would disagree, since the denial of objective values has become a part of what might be thought of
as contemporary folk philosophy. On the other hand, because he does
believe his claims to be self-evident, he believes that it is neither necessary nor possible 5 to defend his claims about value. Nonetheless, Finnis
at least seems to attempt the task he regards as impossible by discussing
extensively his basic values. Perhaps he is merely explaining and not
really defending his claims. Regardless of his purpose, let us see whether
his defense, or explanation, is capable of supporting the view that there
are exactly seven basic values.
The values are self-evident. Does this mean that upon reflection we
will recognize them? Finnis does not think so. In fact, he tells us a good
deal about what is not meant by saying that a principle is self-evident. It
does not mean that each of us (even those guided by the principle) has
formulated it, that each would assent to it if it were formulated, or that
it is possible to arrive at it without experience (i.e., self-evident principles are not known innately). 6 Furthermore, self-evidence has nothing
to do with feelings of certainty; 7 one can doubt the truth of self-evident
principles. Self-evident principles also cannot be deduced or inferred
from facts. For instance, the claim that knowledge is good cannot be
deduced or inferred from the fact (if it is one) that everyone desires it.8
One begins to fear that Finnis is using a ploy all too common in philosophy: making a claim that will seem informative and substantial to the
reader, and then slowly taking away that substance and information by
enumerating the things not meant, eventually reaching a point at which
5 J. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 33, 65. It would be consistent to hold that self-evident
truths are susceptible to proof. Someone with such a view would hold that self-evident truths
can be known in more than one way. Finnis rejects the possibility of proving self-evident
truths because of assumptions about the nature of justification. See infra text accompanying
notes 12-13.
6 See J. FINNIS, sup-a note 2, at 68.
7 Seeid at 69.
8 See id at 66.
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the claim is immune to criticism but at which the reader, if he keeps
track of what has been taken away, is left with nothing to grasp.
What does Finnis say in a positive light about self-evidence? Selfevident values, he says, will be recognized only by those who have experienced them; for example, the value of knowledge will be obvious only
to those who have experienced "the urge to question."9 This claim is in
danger of begging the question, because it may seem to suggest that the
value of knowledge is obvious only to those who have experienced
knowledge as being valuable. Suppose that we have felt the urge to
question but believe knowledge to be at most instrumentally valuable.
Finnis would apparently argue that this belief would not undermine his
claim that it is self-evidently of intrinsic value, because not everyone
needs to recognize self-evident truths, even if their behavior is implicitly
guided by them. Again, one begins to fear that Finnis has little to say
about self-evidence that is positive.
Finnis ultimately rests his appeal to self-evidence on the view that
there must be self-evident principles of justification (or reason) in both
practical and theoretical thought, because justification must end somewhere.' 0 If there were no self-evident principles not themselves in need
of justification, the search for justification would be endless. The threat
of an infinite regress in justification has motivated work in philosophy at
least since Plato, and this fear has often been taken to show that there
must be self-evident principles of justification. But there are other responses to the worry about the possibility of an infinite regress, as Finnis
is apparently aware, because he says that the issue of self-evidence raises
"almost every controverted question in epistemology."" One could respond by claiming that the threat of a regress shows that nothing is
justified; that is, one could become a skeptic. If this were the only alternative, probably most of us would follow Finnis and choose to believe
that some principles are self-evident. More plausible, perhaps, than
either skepticism or an appeal to self-evidence would be the claim, now
popular in epistemology, that while (any particular instance of) justifi12
cation must end somewhere, it need not end in self-evident principles.
No principle of reason and no belief is immune to reasonable doubt.
Any principle or belief can be justifiably revised. Generally those taking
this line with respect to either factual beliefs or values adopt a coherence
theory of justification. A belief is justified by showing that it coheres
with the rest of our beliefs. As we acquire new beliefs, all of our beliefs,
both old and new, are subject to revision in the attempt to achieve co9

Id. at 65.

10 See id at 70.
11 Id. at 67.
12 See, e.g., Williams, Coherence, Jusij ation, and Truth, 34 REv. ML-rAPHYsIcs 243, 253
(1980). For an application of the coherence theory of justification to moral theory, see J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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herence. The process of seeking coherence is the process of justification.
The beliefs taken by some philosophers to be self-evident are simply
those most firmly embedded in our system of belief (or most thoroughly
entangled in our web of belief) and which, therefore, are unlikely to be
revised in the search for coherence.
I do not wish to claim that coherence theories of justification are
without difficulties, 13 but they do form a plausible alternative to the
epistemological views which seek self-evident foundations on which justification can ultimately rest. While Finnis admits that his defense of
self-evidence is controversial, he gives too little attention to explaining
the substance of the controversy. As a result, any reader of the book
unaware of work in recent epistemology may find his case stronger than
it is.
So far, we have looked only at Finnis's claim that his values are selfevident. This is Finnis's official line of defense and, according to him, it
precludes further defense. Nonetheless, a few further claims are made in
support of his theory of value. First, Finnis claims that the values are
connected with characteristic human activities and inclinations; for example, knowledge is connected to the activity of inquiry and the inclination of curiosity. I believe that the attempt to support claims about
objective value by appeal to facts about human nature is more promising than the appeal to self-evidence, and Finnis makes some plausible
claims suggesting that he is making such an appeal. But officially his
appeal to human nature supplies absolutely no support for his views,
because officially his view is that no inference can be made from facts to
values. 14 Still, he suggests that facts about human nature do support
conclusions about values by claiming that reflecting on value constitutes
an attempt to understand one's own nature. 15 Again, Finnis seems to be
using a standard philosophical ploy. He seems to support his view by a
specific sort of argument that has appeal, but that also is open to wellknown objections, and to avoid the objections he denies that he is depending on the argument in question. Those who use the ploy apparently hope that the reader will fail to notice that he is moved to
agreement only by the officially discredited argument. It would be
more satisfying if the author were to take on the objections to his real,
but unacknowledged, arguments.
Finnis continues his discussion of values by claiming that they explain human behavior, in that a piece of conduct is made intelligible
when it is seen as the pursuit of one of the basic values. In fact, he seems
13 Some philosophers, for instance, worry that coherence theories cut justification off
from the world allowing for a perfectly coherent system of beliefs that largely fails to correspond to reality. See Williams, supra note 12.
14 See J. FINNIS, suipra note 2, at 66.
15 See id at 81.
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to say that claiming something to be valuable simply is equivalent to
claiming that reference to its pursuit makes behavior intelligible.16 Furthermore, he claims that the pursuit of the seven basic values exhausts
the basic purposes of human action.' 7 Presumably, it follows from this
that all intentional, intelligible action can be understood as the attempt
to pursue some combination of the seven values.
Does this account of what makes something intrinsically and fundamentally valuable support his list of values? Consider knowledge, the
value discussed most thoroughly by Finnis. Is it true that reference to
the pursuit of knowledge always makes behavior intelligible? Suppose I
see someone muttering to himself while sitting on a Washington Square
bench with his head in the air. I ask what he is doing, and he says he is
counting the leaves on a particular tree. When asked why, he says that
he simply wants to know; he is curious. According to Finnis, this response makes his behavior intelligible. But does it? In a sense it does; I
can understand what he is doing, but surely this cannot be all that Finnis has in mind when he talks of making behavior intelligible. I could
understand what the person who sticks his hand in a fire is doing when
he says he simply wants to feel pain. What calls for explanation is why
anyone would want to feel pain. Similarly, the leaf-counter's behavior is
unintelligible in the sense that I cannot understand why anyone would
simply want to know how many leaves there are on a tree. Finnis, on
the other hand, must maintain that such action is intelligible. While he
does not claim that all knowledge is equally valuable, he does hold that
all knowledge is intrinsically and fundamentally valuable, and he must
be committed to the view that any pursuit of knowledge is intelligible
behavior.
Of course, the leaf-counter's behavior could be explained by a continuation of the story. For example, he could go on to explain that he
had made a large bet about the number of leaves. Such an explanation,
however, fails to assist Finnis. This elaboration of the story only shows
that even this bit of knowledge could have instrumental value, but Finnis's claim is that knowledge is intrinsically valuable. My reason for
failing to understand the leaf-counter's behavior is not that he is wasting
time by not pursuing more valuable forms of knowledge. Even if nothing of value is sacrificed by his counting, I cannot understand why anyone would want that particular piece of knowledge in itself.
A test for value by reference to intelligible behavior does not support Finnis's list very well.' 8 It casts doubt on knowledge, and it sup16
17

See id. at 62.
See id at 92.

18 Finnis would not really regard it as a test, for he believes that values are self-evident
and that it is impossible to prove what is self-evident. Presumably, it follows that there are no
tests for self-evident truths.
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ports the inclusion of something that Finnis omits-pleasure. The
pursuit of pleasure, it seems to me, always makes behavior intelligible.
Suppose the man in Washington Square is sitting with his hand in an
oddly shaped box. When asked what he is doing, he replies that the box
generates an electrical field capable of producing physical pleasure. I
now understand his behavior, and any such reference to pleasure would
produce that understanding. If my intuition about what constitutes intelligible behavior is correct, it would seem that Finnis should say that
pleasure is a basic form of human good.
This does not imply that one must approve of the pleasure-seeker's
action. Perhaps, one could get so attached to the box that things of yet
greater value are neglected. This, however, implies at most that the
pleasure produced by the box is not the only or most important value.
(For instance, there may be greater pleasures.) It does not imply that
the pleasure is not an intrinsic, fundamental value. I could not understand the leaf-counter's behavior even if it did not require sacrificing
anything else of value; I could understand the behavior of the pleasureseeker under the same condition.
Finnis does not ignore pleasure altogether. He uses Nozick's example 19 of an experience machine to show correctly that we place value on
more than our own subjective states, including pleasure.20 But this can
show only that we value things other than pleasure, not that pleasure is
not included among the things that we value. Similarly, Finnis echoes
Butler's point that many pleasures depend on valuing things other than
pleasure.2 1 (For instance, I would not have been pleased to learn that
Northwestern had finally won a football game after its long losing streak
if I had not independently desired that outcome.) But the point of Butler's argument must be restricted (something Butler apparently failed to
notice). While some pleasures are parasitic on independent values, not
all are. In general, most physical pleasure is not so dependent. For instance, were someone to slip boiled lobster meat into my mouth, I would
most certainly experience pleasure, even if I were so unfortunate as to
never have heard of lobster before. Butler's argument, like Nozick's,
shows only that we value things other than pleasure, not that pleasure is
not among the things we value intrinsically.
On the whole, Finnis's list of values is plausible. I value most of the
items on his list, and I suspect if anything is objectively valuable, then
most of these are. This degree of agreement, however, does not commit
one to agreeing with Finnis's very strong claims about value. He claims
that his list is exhaustive and self-evident. While his claims about what
is valuable may well be correct, I find little to agree with in his argu-

20

See R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974).
See J. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 95-96.

21

See J. BUTLER, FIVE SERMONS 14, 51 (1950).

19
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ments as to why this is true.2 2
II
THE RIGHT

From his account of objective value, Finnis proceeds to outline nine
requirements of practical reasonableness. These are very abstract, fundamental, practical principles. They are said to be requirements of
method, 23 because the nature of value makes them a necessary part of
any pursuit of value. The fact that there are seven, separate, irreducible, and equally fundamental values is primarily responsible for the necessity of these requirements. Were there a single fundamental value, its
pursuit would require a different and, presumably, simpler method.
The diverse sources of value, for instance, account for the first requirement, that we form a coherent plan of life. Because there are several
values, because we can participate in each value in an infinite number
of ways, and because our lives are finite, we must make choices about
the values to which we form our primary commitment(s), and about the
specific projects through which we pursue those values. Such a plan and
such commitment are said to be necessary for any significant participation in the forms of good.
According to Finnis, the most striking and controversial implication of the diversity of value for the method of value promotion is that
all consequentialist moral theories turn out to be worse than false; they
24
turn out to be literally senseless or incoherent.
Finnis admits a limited role for consequentialist reasoning with his
sixth requirement of practical reasonableness that good be brought
about efficiently. Little is said in a general way about the cases that
admit to consequentialist reasoning, except: "Where one way of participating in a human good includes both all the good aspects and effects of
its alternative, and more, it is reasonable to prefer that way: a remedy
that both relieves pain and heals is to be preferred to the one that
merely relieves pain. ' 25 Therefore, if I am considering one plan of action that will promote knowledge and another that promotes knowledge
to the same degree but also involves play, then, presumably, the second
is preferable.
22 Finnis offers one further argument for the value of knowledge: anyone denying that
knowledge is valuable has uttered an "operationally self-refuting" proposition, because, by
asserting that knowledge has no value, one implicitly commits oneself to holding that it is
valuable to make the assertion, that it is valuable to convey a particular truth and, hence,
that it is valuable to know that knowledge has no value. Ste J. FINNIs, .upra note 2, at 74-75.
At best, this argument shows less than Finnis wants, because the value of knowledge (if
any)
to which the speaker commits himself may be instrumental rather than intrinsic. Denying the
intrinsic value of knowledge would not be operationally self-refuting.
23
24

See J. FINNIS, supra note 2, at 102.
Ste id at 112.

25

Id at 111 (emphasis in original).
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But consequentialist reasoning has very little application, because
each of the seven values is equally basic and fundamental. That is,
there is no objective priority of moral importance among the values and
none can be reduced to any of the others. This implies that the different
values are incommensurable. Given one situation in which the value of
life is represented to a particular degree and another in which the value
of knowledge is represented to a particular degree, it simply makes no
sense to ask which situation holds the most value. There is no common
measure of value capable of allowing us to compare the value of a given
amount of life with a given amount of knowledge. As a result, consequentialist moral theories are inapplicable in most cases; we cannot
choose how to act by seeing which act produces consequences containing more value than its alternatives.
Suppose that Finnis is right about the incommensurability of values
and the incoherence of consequentialism: those of us who wish to act
rightly cannot do so simply by seeking to promote value to the greatest
possible extent. What are we to do? What are the guidelines for morally correct conduct? To some extent, Finnis would say that we can
simply choose how to act. While there is no objective priority among
values, we are permitted to choose to treat some of them as being more
important in our own lives. Indeed, the brevity of life makes this necessary for significant participation in any value. In order to pursue one
value significantly, we must forgo many opportunities for participation
in others.
There are limits, however, in how far we can go to promote the
values that we have chosen. While we may choose to place primary
importance on a single value, the second requirement of practical reasonableness is that we recognize the objective value of all seven values.
This leads to the more substantive seventh requirement that "one
should not choose to do any act which ofitself does nothing but damage or
impede a realization or participation of any one or more of the basic
forms of human good. ' ' 26 In order to make this requirement compatible
with the necessity of committing ourselves to particular values and the
resulting failure to perform acts that would promote the realization of
other values, Finnis distinguishes between directly and indirectly damaging basic goods. 27 Failing to promote a basic good because of the
effort to seek another good is a case of indirect damage and is permissible.2 8 The seventh requirement applies to all acts; it is always wrong to
26 Id at 118 (emphasis in original).
27 See id at 120.
28 1 shall not attempt to explain how this distinction could be sharply drawn. It is
meant to play a role in Finnis's moral theory that is similar, but not identical, to the roles
played within other moral theories by the distinctions between harming and failing to benefit,
and between intending an outcome and bringing an outcome about as a foreseen but unintended consequence.
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perform an action that of itself does nothing but directly damage any of
the basic goods. This requirement, Finnis says, justifies the "strict invio'29
lability of basic human rights.
It is important to understand the connections between Finnis's theory of value and this theory of right action. There are seven basic values
among which there is no objective priority. Hence, these values are incommensurable, and consequentialism is ruled out as a fundamental
general theory of morally correct action. Because we must reject consequentialism, Finnis argues that it is always wrong to perform an action
that directly damages a basic value. The argument for this conclusion is
that such conduct could only be justified by claiming that the damage is
outweighed by the value being protected or promoted. But values are
incommensurable, so the only possible justification for directly damaging a basic value fails. The outline of this argument is interesting, and I
am sympathetic with both the claim that values are irreducibly diverse
and the rejection of consequentialism. 30 Nonetheless, the details of Finnis's argument are incapable of supporting the conclusions he draws.
As we have seen, Finnis does leave some room for consequentialist
reasoning, but that room may be greater than his discussion of the seventh requirement implies. In particular, just as the justified use of consequentialism is limited, the scope of the seventh requirement should be
limited by the area within which values can be compared. Finnis, however, renders absolute the requirement that we not directly damage a
basic value, and his argument cannot support a position this strong.
The only argument given for the seventh requirement is that it is made
necessary by the incommensurability of values and the subsequent incoherence of consequentialism. Finnis's strategy, therefore, implies that
when the values of different outcomes can be compared, it is permissible
to use consequentialist reasoning and to act on the basis of that reasoning. Because the impossibility of consequentialist reasoning results from
the existence of diverse values, it would seem that when only differences
in a single value are at stake in the choice among alternative actions, the
value of alternative outcomes can be compared. In such cases, for all
Finnis says, it ought to be permissible to choose the act with the best
consequences. In fact, doing so ought to be required as a case of bringing about the good efficiently under the sixth requirement.
29
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Although Finnis rejects consequentialism, it is interesting to note that he shares a
major assumption about moral theory with the consequentialists: namely, that a theory of
what is valuable (or good) must determine the correct theory of permissible (or right) action.
This assumption can be challenged and typically is within "liberal" political theories, which
tend to view principles concerning permissible action as the result of a compromise among
agents with conflicting theories of value, none of which can legitimately claim superiority to
any of the others. For a recent example of this liberal approach, see B.A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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In explaining his seventh requirement of practical reasonableness,
Finnis offers the following example of its application:
[I]f consequentialist reasoning were reasonable, one might sometimes
reasonably kill some innocent person to save the lives of some hostages. But consequentialist reasoning is arbitrary and senseless ...
act which of itself
So we are left with the fact that such a killing is an
31
does nothing but damage the basic value of life.
Given the nature of Finnis's argument, this is a poor example. Assuming that the trade-off really is one in which one action will result in one
death and another action in many, this ought to be a case in which
consequentialist reasoning is not "senseless." According to his description of the example, there is no need to attempt to compare the magnitude of different values. It is simply a choice between more or less life.
Only the magnitude of a single basic value rests on one's decision, so the
value of the alternative outcomes are commensurable. Because Finnis's
only argument against consequentialism rests on the incommensurability of the value of outcomes, and because he permits (indeed requires)
consequentialist reasoning when the values of outcomes can be compared, he has no argument against killing the innocent person to save
hostages.
I am not advocating killing innocent persons for consequentialist
reasons, but it should be apparent that Finnis's strong rejection of consequentialism and his subsequent acceptance of the rigid seventh requirement of practical reasonableness, cannot be supported by his argument
from incommensurability. No doubt, there are ways in which one might
try to meet my objection. For instance, it might be argued that there
are never (or at most are very rarely) real cases of important moral decisions where only the magnitude of a single basic value is at stake. Such
a claim is at least initially plausible, but initial plausibility often misleads, and I would want to see this claim defended before accepting it.
At any rate, the arguments actually offered by Finnis do not support his
blanket rejection of consequentialism and his absolute prescription not
to damage a basic good directly.
There are other worries that one might have about accepting the
seventh requirement as being absolute. Suppose Sam, who is deaf, is
about to be hit by a bus running a red light, and I have time to push
him out of the bus's path. Unfortunately, I can only reach Sam in time
by a route requiring me to knock over a small table at which people are
playing chess. If I save Sam, will I not have directly damaged the basic
good of play? Finnis might not be compelled to accept this example as
one proscribed by the seventh requirement. Perhaps, he could argue
that saving Sam and disrupting the game are both part of a single act,
31
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so that one is not performing an act that does nothing but damage a basic
value. But it is easy to change the example to meet such replies. Suppose that I am too far from Sam to save him, but I can shout to Ralph,
one of the chess players, who could then save him. Here the saving
would be the result of a subsequent act. My act of shouting, of itself,
does nothing but directly damage the basic value of play. Finnis should
say that it would be impermissible for me to shout; yet surely this should
be permissible.
If these observations are correct, they probably raise doubts about
Finnis's claim that play is as basic a value as life. Even if Finnis is correct about there being several basic values, none of which is reducible to
any of the others, we need not agree that there is no objective priority
among them; 32 indeed, I believe that we have good reason not to agree.

Accepting his claims about value leads to the seventh requirement of
practical reasonableness, which in turn makes it impermissible to damage (directly) any good in order to promote another. Because values are
incommensurable, the magnitude of damage and promotion is irrelevant. Therefore, it will often be impermissible to prevent two minutes
of chess or movie watching (aesthetic experience) in order to save a life.
Suppose we are asked to destroy a painting to have hostages released
rather than killed. Would it be impermissible? Finnis should say it is.
Suppose an entire city is being held hostage. Still, he should say it
would be wrong. It would be easy to multiply examples. I cannot accept these implications of Finnis's theory of value for this theory of right
conduct.
The lack of objective priority among values leads to further worries,
because we are permitted (indeed required) to set a subjective priority
among values through our commitments and projects. Let us-return to
Ralph, one of the chess players in the previous example. He notices that
Sam is about to be killed and realizes that it is possible to save him.
Unfortunately, this would require him to interrupt his concentration on
the game, and the physical exertion required would so upset him that he
would be unable to play well for several days. Ralph has made his primary commitment to the good of play and specifically to the game of
chess. Ralph is morally conscientious, and he recognizes the objective
value of life, so he would never perform an action that of itself did nothing but directly damage life. But by continuing the game (continuing to
pursue the good of play) and allowing Sam to die, he damages life only
indirectly, so he continues.
According to Finnis's account of value, Ralph's inaction is not
wrong. Indeed, he is not even a bad person, for he recognizes all the
32 For an example of a philosopher who believes that it is possible to choose correctly
even when irreducibly distinct values are in conflict, see T. NAGEL, The Fragmentationof Value,
in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128-41 (1979).
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values and has committed himself to their pursuit in a reasonable manner. But were Ralph to reason and act in the manner described, clearly
he would be an objectionable person. It is simply not true that a commitment to any of Finnis's values is as good as a commitment to any of
the others.
Finnis addresses this type of objection by claiming that it is clearly
permissible to commit oneself to scholarship even though this requires
one to fail to save lives by becoming a physician. 33 This seems plausible,
but I believe its plausibility results largely from living in a community
with a system of economic rewards that ensures an adequate supply of
physicians. Were there many scholars and too few physicians, and if I
had the ability to be a physician, then I would be a worse person were I
to become a scholar rather than a physician.
Finnis's claim that each of his seven values has equal objective importance seems one of the book's most implausible claims. Furthermore,
this claim leads to implausible implications in his theory of right action.
I do not know how to show that there is an objective priority of importance among values, but then I also do not know how to show that anything is objectively valuable or to show what, if anything, has such
value. Finnis believes that it is self-evident that certain things are objectively valuable. The claim that these values are of unequal objective
importance is as evident to me as the claim that they are objectively
valuable at all.
CONCLUSION

I have chosen to discuss only the fundamental elements of Finnis's
theory of natural law: the basic principles of value and right action. As
with most natural law theories, these fundamental elements are more
interesting than what follows, because they are supposed to be capable
of supporting fairly traditional beliefs in moral and political theory, for
example, that we have reason to be just. I have argued that whatever
the merit of the later stages of Finnis's theory, his fundamental claims
about value are substantially flawed and, hence, cannot serve as the
foundation for moral, political, and legal theory. Therefore, as a sustained argument for a theory of natural law, the book fails. Nevertheless, his efforts in political and legal theory may deserve more attention
than I have been able to give them here, even though they cannot rest
securely on the theory of value that Finnis develops.
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